Agric. Econ. - Czech, 2013, 59(2):81-89 | DOI: 10.17221/52/2012-AGRICECON

Cartels and its behaviour on food marketsOriginal Paper

Lucie SEVEROVÁ1, Stanislav BENDL2
1 Department of Economic Theories, Faculty of Economics and Management, Czech University of Life Sciences Prague, Prague, Czech Republic
2 School & Social Pedagogy Department, Faculty of Education, Charles University in Prague, Prague, Czech Republic

Collusive oligopoly is an oligopolistic market model with several companies producing the same or similar products (services) and acting in the market as a monopoly. The goal of the paper is to find out whether the collusive oligopolies are created in the food-products market, in what range the cartel agreements appear in the given sector and whether they can notably influence the price level of the food products and therefore have an important impact on consumer demand in the Czech Republic. The result of the analysis is that, although a substantial part of the agro-production arises outside of the oligopolistic structure (in conditions of monopolistic competition among small agricultural producers); the trade with these products is mainly held in oligopolistic sectors.

Keywords: agro production, baking companies, cartel, food market, oligopoly competition

Published: February 28, 2013  Show citation

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SEVEROVÁ L, BENDL S. Cartels and its behaviour on food markets. Agric. Econ. - Czech. 2013;59(2):81-89. doi: 10.17221/52/2012-AGRICECON.
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